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Tom Lodge
Post colonial southern African states are distinctive for their relative administrative capacity
and their fairly effective governance. Analysis of African states has identified a prevalent
set of weaknesses: uncertain territorial jurisdiction, underperformance, overconsumption of
restricted resources, external dependency, corruption and the privatisation of public resources
by unproductive ruling groups'. No southern African state is entirely free of these
shortcomings but they affect the functioning of government less in this region than elsewhere
in Africa. Southern African states differ characteristically from most African post-colonial
states in having stronger or at least longer established traditions of legitimation and political
continuity. In several countries the formation of the modern state has been facilitated by the
congruence of frontiers with precolonial political boundaries: Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland,
Zimbabwe and in certain respects, South Africa have benefitted from this. In the cases of
South Africa and Zimbabwe especially, complete sovereignty or at least considerable political
autonomy for most of the century, has enabled their administrations to develop a degree of
social impermeability. State.autonomy is also facilitated by what are in African terms quite
well developed capitalist class structures in relatively diversified economies; in especially
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Swaziland, the state is less significant than elsewhere
upon the continent as a nexus of class formation and hence can function more independently
of specific social forces. These qualities reflect the comparatively sophisticated bureaucratic
development required to administer a labour repressive mining economy which evolved at
the turn the century, fairly extensive secondary industrialisation in South Africa and
Zimbabwe, and sharply differentiated social structures which include large and well organised
working classes and correspondingly vigorous industrial, commercial and agricultural
bourgeoisies.
What follows is an elaboration of this argument which will examine in turn the salient
characteristics of all the southern African states considering their functional disposition and
effectiveness before discussing their social orientation and their relationships with the
societies they govern.
With its 1.7 million employees2 South Africa's public sector is the largest in Africa and its
division until 1994 into five notionally sovereign separate entities and further ten ethnically
or racially designated administrations made it one of the most bureaucratically fragmented.
Its growth was fastest in the 1950s and it began to slow and even shrink in some sectors in
'See: Pierre Landell-Mills, "Governance, Cultural Change and Empowerment", Journal of Modern African
Studies, 30, 4 (1992), pp. 543-567; Martin Doornbos, "The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and
prospect", Journal of Modern African Studies, 28, 2 (1990), pp. 179-198; Joshua B Forrest, "The Quest for State
"Hardness" in Africa", Comparative Politics, July 1988, pp. 423-441; Larry Diamond, "Class Formation in the
Modern African State", Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), pp. 25-47.
"This figure includes half a million employees of parastatal corporations. The civil service proper included in
1994 the 420,000-strong Public Service of South Africa, 170,000 teachers, 431,000 employees of homeland
governments and 70,000 in "other services" (Source: fnfospec, 4 August 1995, p. 9). 65,6 per cent of employees
in the public service in 1994 were black.
the mid 1980s. It's expenditure represents less than a third of GNP, relatively low for an
African state3. Like other African states, it employs a significant share of the economically
active population, 15 per cent4, though in comparison to other African countries public
employment share of the modern sector is quite limited is quite limited. State-owned
corporations have made an important contribution to economic development, beginning with
the formation of ISCOR in 1927 but only six of the top forty firms in South Africa are
nationalised, these include the post office, the transport system and electricity supply5 and
their 100,000 or so employees represent a small fraction of the industrial workforce. State
intervention within the economy has had mixed effects but without state initiatives and
controls its is extremely doubtful that South African would have as large or as advanced
manufacturing sector as it does today. Some of the most internationally competitive sections
of South African industry are linked to state initiatives6. An indication of the South African
state's administrative capacity is the share of its revenue derived from personal taxation; at
forty per cent in 1995 much higher than is the case with most Africa governments which
chiefly finance themselves through customs receipts. Other good indicators of administrative
reach or state penetration into society are primary school enrolment and social security
coverage: most South African children attend at least a few years of school and all adults
over 65 are entitled to a very small pension though access to education and other state
services is historically racially skewed. Up until the 1980s, the state's coercive capacity was
formidable, manifest in its control over the geographical mobility of black South Africans
and the annual conviction and imprisonment of about 300,000 "pass offenders"7 as well as
the forced resettlement of nearly three million people between 1960 and 1980. During the
1980s, confronted with rising levels of popular rebellion as well as perceived external threats
the state underwent a degree of militarisation; soldiers increasingly assumed administrative
and policy making functions and security forces received a larger share of the budget.
Military expenditure as a proportion of GDP remained modest by African standards, though.
Diminishing administrative capacity in the 1980s was signalled by the abolition of the pass
laws in 1986 once it was obvious that an overburdened "influx control" system had become
ineffectual. Other signs of bureaucratic degeneration included from 1979 a series of major
financial scandals affecting high levels of government. Petty corruption had long been a
feature of lower echelon administration particularly in the rural homelands and in black
•"Francis Wilson, "Poverty, the State and Redistribution: Some reflections", in Nicoli Nattrass (ed.), The
Political Economy of South Africa, Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1990, p. 231.
4Annette Seegers, "Towards an understanding of the Afrikanerisation of theSouth African State", Africa, 63
(4). 1993, p. 41.
5Duncan Reekie, "The Parastatals" in Charles Simkins and Merle Upton (eds.), State and Market in Post-
Apurtheui South Africa, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1993, p. 130.
ftE.g. telecommunications. For details see David Kaplan, "State policy and technological change - the
development of the South African Telecommunications industry", Journal of Southern African Studies, 15, 3, 1989,
pp. 565-580.
7[n the year ending June 1978 313 850 people were prosecuted under the pass laws (South African Institute of
Race Relations, Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, Johannesburg, 1980, pp. 301-302).
townships but large scale venality in central government was a relative novelty8. For white
South Africans, since its inception in 1910, the state's legitimacy rested upon legally
guaranteed privileges and a liberal constitution; executive power was strengthened
considerably in 1983 simultaneously with the extension of representative government to
Indian and coloured minorities and from the 1950s the scope of judicial independence and
authority was substantially curtailed. Black acqufesence to this order resulted from the
absence of obvious alternatives to state power and, between 1950 and 1980, the successful
creation of an regimented residential environment for a growing working class. By the mid
1970s the progress of guerilla insurgency in the region and public housing shortages and
overcrowded schools all detracted from the state's authority. In the eighties unprecedented
levels of local authority corruption and a fiscal crisis removed whatever shreds of legitimacy
had to that date been retained by local state structures in black townships. Nation wide
localised insurrections in 1984-1985 prompted the construction of a parallel local
administration led by soldiers under the direct of a National Security Management System
until its dismantling in 19909. A new constitution in 1994 established nine new regional
governments in place of four provincial administrations and ten ethnic homelands, granted
universal suffrage and made executive and legislative institutions subordinate to a
presidentially appointed constitutional court. Central government retains the power to
overrule most laws made by regional assemblies.
The bureaucracy which has presided over these developments has in its upper echelons since
the 1930s been chiefly recruited from white Afrikaans speakers; in the 1950s promotion and
recruitment policies discriminated in favour of supporters of the ruling National Party10.
Seegers has noted that from the 1940s the bureaucratic elite came from an Afrikaner culture
which contained "infantilising family dynamics", an "in built tendency to divide" and "an
organised religious life (which) bequeathed a curiously non assertive and reactive leadership
style based upon a lifetime of conformity and propriety"11. From the 1970s, black
employment in senior civil service ranks increased especially as a consequence of the
establishment of separate services for independent and self governing homelands, though in
the central government of 3,239 "top public servants" in 1990 only 15 were African12. By
the 1970s entry into the administrative ranks normally required a university degree but
remained uncompetitive. Traditionally, senior civil servants were recruited from a narrow
"Albert Venter, South African Government and Politics, Southern Books, Johannesburg, 1989, p. 76
9Aniiette Seegers, "Extending the Security Network to the Local Level" in Chris Heymans and Gerhard
Totenieyer (eds.), Government by the People, Juta, Cape Town, 1988, pp. 119-141.
10Staniey Trapido, "Political Institutions and Afrikaner Social Structures in the Republic of South Africa",
American Political Science Review, 57, 1963, pp. 75-87.
1
 'Annette Seegers, "Toward an understanding of the Afrikanerisation of the South african State", Africa, 63
(4), 1993, p. 486. Bureaucratic reformers in the 1990s have argued that from an international perspective South
African public management is unusually "authoritarian, highly rigid and inflexible" (Patrick Fitzgerald, quoted in
Jovial Rantao, "For a more civil service, Tiie Star, 8 November, 1994).
''Job Mokgoro, "Reincorporation of the TBVC states" in Fanie Cloete and Job Mokgoro (eds.), Policies/or
Public Service Transformation, Juta, Cape Town, 1995, p. 66.
range of institutions, notably the Universities of Stellenbosch and Pretoria, and this helped
to strengthen the corporate identity of a specialised administrative class. A Public Service
Commission was meant to ensure against nepotism and political favouritism: during the 1950s
its recommendations began to be habitually overruled. Patronage, however, was strategic
rather than personal, geared to Afrikaner Nationalist social objectives. This degree of
integrity may not have been maintained in the 1980s when corruption within one central
government department prompted an official enquiry to comment that "billions" of had been
lost through theft, fraud and incompetence with the complicity of senior management13.
Since 1994, efforts to socially diversify senior ranks may have increased the scope of
political and personal patronage14.
Bureaucratic corruption in the 1980s was attributable to a growing culture of official secrecy
as well as an increasing embourgeoisfication of the Afrikaner governing class. Until the
1980s, though, the South African state had a well demonstrated capacity for removing itself
from the influence of specific social classes. This has been explained by Yudelman as being
caused by the relative strength of a "legitimation imperative" arising from the institution of
democratic politics (for whites) before the creation of an industrial society15. This helps to
account for the state's extraordinary attentiveness to the needs of farmers until recent decades
and the ambiguities in its relationship with big business. In its early development, revenues
derived from gold-mining taxation enabled it to develop the bureaucratic apparatus needed
to channel and control the flows of cheap labour required by different sectors of the
economy, embark upon a programme of secondary industrialisation, and incorporate an
enfranchised white labour aristocracy. Each of these tasks both required and reinforced the
state's autonomy from narrow sectional interests. In more modern times the extent to which
the South African state's decision's have been governed by the imperatives of maintaining
white supremacy or the less restricted dictates of industrial modernisation remain
academically contested; either of these, though, suggest a governing elite possessing, in
African terms, a remarkable freedom of manoeuvre.
In stark contrast to this relative power are the constraints confronting any government
seriously contemplating social reform in Namibia. Under the South African mandate
Namibia was in many respects governed as an integral part of South Africa. 100,000 white
settlers enjoyed parliamentary representation in Cape Town from 1950 and even before then
had been the beneficiaries of developmental policies which have resulted in modern Namibia
'•*Danny Sing and Malcolm Wallis, "Corruption and Nepotism" in Fanie Cloete and Job Mokgoro (eds.), op
tit, pp. 142-143.Homeland governments as well as those central government agencies which interfaced with them
were particularly susceptible to financial misbehaviour. In 1995 the Skweyiya Commission of Inquiry drew attention
to a R177 million power station whicli had not produced a single unit of power and which duplicated facilities
already available: altogether the Commission found that the Mangope administration had misused or misappropriated
R200.000 of public funds ("Bop power station called 'biggest fraud in SA history'", TJie Star, 9 October, 1995).
l4This may be especially the case with tendering by the new provincial governments. For reports of allegations
of corrupt tendering in the Northern province and Mpumalanga: Adam Cooke "Allegations of corrupt deals in
Mpumalanga tender board", T7te Star, 9 October, 1995 and Adam Cooke, "Corruption talk hits a tender nerve", 77ie
Star, 18 October, 1995.
15David Yudelman, Vie Emergence of Modem South Africa, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1983.
having one of the best communications infrastructures in Africa. South African tax, credit
and pricing policies more or less ruled out any local manufacturing or processing and
favoured livestock ranching and mining; as a consequence, Namibia's economy is externally
oriented to a degree unusual even for a developing country. Most public services were
directed at settlers inhabiting the "police zone": in 1973 592 state schools accommodated
138, 890 African pupils while 23,154 white children attended 1,233 schools16. In 1975
African secondary school enrolment at 3,654 was about a quarter of white high school
attendance. Most health facilities used by Africans were run by missionaries with the help
of government subsidies. In general, for black Namibians access to government services in
the 1970s was lower than in relatively much poorer African countries such as Tanzania.
Rudimentary "homeland" bureaucracies developed in the northern reserves; these employed
1050 chiefs and headmen in 1972. Repressive state capacity, though, was evident in such
regulatory mechanisms as the "influx control" which as in South Africa governed the
mobility of contract workers between jobs and the northern labour reserves. Counter-
insurgency in the 1980s represented a formidable extension of state power. From 1980, at
least 70,000 South African soldiers would be stationed in Namibia as well as a newly created
local army, the SWA Territorial Force, mustering at its peak 30,000, and South African
military expenditure would well exceed South West African government revenues. 50,000
civilians were compelled to live in strategic hamlets, gaining access to a broader range of
state benefits (primary school enrolment doubled in seven years) but more exposed to a
soldiery whose violence against civilians was increasingly routinised. At the same time,
consociational political reforms delegated welfare administration to eleven ethnic governments
prompting the growth of a new black elite of about 40,000 households led by politicians,
senior civil servants and professionals but also considerably extending the scope of official
venality17. These governments spent about forty per cent of SWA revenues, devoting a
portion of this expenditure to subsidising the development of a new class of black politician-
farmers who took over former white owned cattle ranches. Increasing public expenditure
was financed through loans, mainly from South Africa and South African revenue transfers.
Direct South African military expenditure may have concealed significant sums directed at
"strategic" civilian projects'8.
Independence and fuller democratic government was secured in 1990 through constitutional
undertakings which include the maintenance of property relations and the retention of civil
servants on their existing salaries and benefits. Consequently Namibia has one of the best
paid civil services in sub-saharan Africa19. 50,000 returning exiles have helped to prompt
I6Reginald Green, Marja-Liisa Kiljunen and Kimmo Kiljunen (eds.), Namibia: Tfie Last Colony, Longman,
Harlow, 1981, pp. 107-108.
l7Chris Tapscott, "War, Peace and Social Classes" inColin Leys and John Saul (eds.), Namibia's Liberation
Struggle, James Currey, London, 1995, p. 157.
"Svolfgang Thomas, "The economy in transition to independence" in Robert Rotberg (ed.), Namibia: Political
ami Economic Prospects, David Philip. Cape Town, 1983, pp. 59-70.
l9For an impressionistic and favourable evaluation of the quality of senior echelons of government see John Saul
and Colin Leys, "The Legacy - an afterword" in Saul and Leys, op cit, p. 198.
an expansion of the bureaucracy from 43,000 in 1990 to more than 70,000 four years later20.
Ethnic governments have been absorbed into a second layer of thirteen regional
administrations. The administration also includes a 10,000 strong Namibian Defence Force
recruited from former combatants in the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and
SWATF veterans under the command of Solomon Hawala, ex-chief of security at SWAPO's
main base in Southern Angola. 13,000 other'PLAN cadres have been placed in
"Development Brigades" stationed in old army bases near the Northern border21. Aside from
spending nearly half its revenues on renumeration the government has devoted large shares
of public expenditure to education (29 per cent in 1995 and health (17 per cent). Despite
new demands upon the budget, government spending as a share of GDP remained at about
a third between 1992 and 199522. Meanwhile, though, through the nineties, gross capital
investment has declined so the prospects of school graduates finding jobs have deteriorated
steadily. In 1995 social security legislation extended state benefits to all employees, of
whom 40 per cent work in the public sector23. More modestly, a very cautious land reform
programme resettled 16,000 families on state purchased farming allotments. State revenues
are closely tied to mineral prices; until its fifty per cent purchase of de Beers, the most
important component in the government's revenue was company tax, mainly derived from
the mining corporations. Poor prices and sluggish external investment have limited the
government's capacity to institute major social reforms; its budgets remain conservative and
planning is secretive rather than consultative. The appointment of a Malaysian financier to
the new Reserve Bank set up in 1990 signalled the government's commitment to business
friendly policies. As the governing political party SWAPO's own authoritarian traditions
help to explain the "arrogance of power" discernable to some observers24 and manifest in
such actions as the purchase of presidential and prime ministerial aeroplanes, the assignment
of fishing quotas to cabinet members, and the expenditure of drought relief for drilling
boreholes on politicians' farms25. This latter allegation may reflect a significant continuity
with the social predisposition of the mandate regime which afforded huge subsidies in times
of need to the 5,000 white ranchers who monopolised the territory's commercial
agriculture26. A 70 per cent victory in Namibia's second general election gave SWAPO's
leadership the power to alter the constitution; unless an economic upturn supplies the
""'"Small but determined". Financial Mail, 28 September, 1994.
2
 'Economist Intelligence Unit, Namibia Country Profile, 1992 tl993, London, 1993, 10; Simon Shikangalah,
"The Development Brigade: The Namibian Experience" in Jakkie Cilliers, Dismissed: Demobilization and
Reinuyration of Former Combatants in Africa, Institute for Defence Policy, Midrand, 1995, pp. 70-71.
"Finance Week, 11 May, 1995.
"^Cliris Tapscott, "national reconciliation, social equity and class formation in Independent Namibia", Journal
of Southern African Studies, 19 1 March 1993, p. 33.
"
4John Saul and Colin Leys, "The legacy - an afterword" in Saul and Leys, op cir, p. 203.
'
5See reports in TJie Guardian, 9 December, 1994; Tlie Citizen, 22 June, 1995; Finance Week, 11 May, 1995.
"
hFor analysis of "unusually generous" state aid for economically marginal white agricultural settlers in the
1920s and 1930s see A B Emmett, 77ie Rise of African Nationalism in South West Africa/Namibia, 1915-1966, Ph
D Dissertation, Department of Political Studies, University of the Witwatersrand 1987, pp. 153-157.
incentive to keep the political rules unchanged the future of liberal democratic consolidation
in Namibia seems unpromising, to say the least.
As with South Africa and, to an extent, Namibia, relative bureaucratic efficiency is also a
feature of the post-colonial Zimbabwean state. Self government from 1923 prompted the
growth of regulatory mechanisms within the economy which encouraged local capital
accumulation. As in South Africa, state capital in the 1930s was responsible for the first
moves towards industrialisation with the establishment of an iron and steel corporation and
the Cold Storage Commission27. From the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965
to the installation of a majoritarian government in 1980 state capacity was considerably
expanded through the requirements of counter-insurgency and sanctions evasion. State
expenditure grew by thirty per cent a year between 1969 and 1978: by 1980 more than a
third of this spending was militarily oriented28. Income tax, mainly extracted from the white
minority, contributed the largest share of revenue, 44 per cent, followed by sales tax,
accounting for nearly a quarter of the government's financing29. Half a million inhabitants
of "protected villages" and the rapid growth of secondary industry under a strict import
substitution regime testified to the extension of state power during the UDI period. By the
late 1970s this power was fraying at the edges; by 1979 guerillas had closed 1,500 rural
schools, one third of the total and more than a quarter of the protected villages30. Ninety one
elected African Councils, the local authorities in rural areas, had been compelled to suspend
operations. In 1964, the civil service employed 40,000 people; by independence in 1980 its
numbers had nearly trebled, partly a consequence of a rapid expansion of education as well
as militarisation31. By 1983, the upper echelons were predominantly black as senior white
administrators either retired or emigrated. For some analysts, continuing state effectiveness
is evident from the progress of a land reform programme which within ten years had
undertaken the resettlement of 50,000 peasant households on serviced plots as well as from
successful initiatives in the provision of rural primary health care and primary education32.
These achievements seem all the more remarkable given the scope of administrative
dislocation in the final years of the war. About sixty per cent of Zimbabwean babies are
now born in government facilities and the distribution of these 450 centres is evenly spread
:7Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990, p. 19.
2&M\chae\Brman/'ThePub]icServiceinZimbabwe\ PoliticalScienceQuarterty, 95,3,1980, pp. 445-446.
29Bratton, op cit, p. 450.
30Bratton, op cit, p. 453.
31Michael Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe", Political Science Quarterly, 95, 1, 1980, p, 447.
32Herbst, op cit. Primary school enrolment increased from 719,000 in 1979 to 2.2 million in 1985 while the
secondary .school population rose from 79,000 to 500,000 (Jonathan Moyo, "State Politics and Social Domination
in Zimbabwe", Journal of Modem African Studies, 30 2 (1992), p. 316. Zimbabwe now takes more children,
proportionately through ten years of non-vocational schooling than any other country in the world (Norman
Reynolds, "Lessons for South Africa from the First Decade of Zimbabwe's Independence", Centre for Policy
Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 14).
8throughout the country33. Relative state autonomy can be discerned in the government's
ability to resist urban pressures for cheap food and the maintenance of pricing policies which
are broadly favourable to farmers34. State controlled crop marketing boards remained
through the 1980s comparatively efficient and have continued to channel their surplus into
agricultural investments rather than as in many African instances serving mainly as a
mechanism for transferring rurally generated resources to the cities and industrial sectors35.
However, since 1980, white farmer lobbies have lost the political influence they acquired
during the UDI period36 and the government policies attempt to promote the fortunes of
peasant producers. Government controls over the direction of foreign investment capital had
been, by 1990, rather successful at making the heavily protected domestic manufacturing
more competitive, a reflection of the highly sophisticated financial regulatory structure which
had developed during UDI37.
Critical reviews of post-colonial Zimbabwean politics suggest that strong continuities of class
bias exist between the Mugabe administration and its predecessor, pointing to the gradualist
implementation of land reform, the entry into the large scale landowning class of members
of the political elite, the continuing influence from the UDI period of the Reserve Bank in
economic decisions38, and the high level corruption revelations which followed the 1989
Willowgate scandal39. Class predispositions of the civil service are probably mainly
attributable to the technocratic bias of a bureaucracy whose officers continue to be heavily
influenced by an anglocentric educational system as well as the inherited norms and routines
of the settler government. Electoral evidence suggests that peasants and older people find
it easier to identify with ZANU and the state than young townsfolk, in the case of the former
JJChristine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: Tlie Terrain of Contradictory Development, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991,
p. 128.
34Hcrbst, op tit, p. 82.
^TorSkalnes, "Group Interests and the State: An Explanation of Zimbabwe's Agricultural Policies", Journal
of Modern African Studies, 27, 1, 1989, pp. 90-91
j6During the early 1970s annual government subsidies and loans were worth S8,000 per capita (Colin Stoneman
(ed.), Zimbabwe's Prospects, Macmillan Publishers, London, 1988, p. 8.)
j7Howard Lehman, "The Paradox of State Power in Africa: Debt Management Policies in Kenya and
Zimbabwe'. African Studies Review, 35, 2 (September 1992), p. 19.
j8Norman Reynolds, "Lessons for South Africa from the First Decade of Zimbabwe's Independence", Centre
for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, 1990, p. 8.
j9Fox press reports on official Zimbabwean corruption: Michael Hartnack, "Zimbabwe's media is silent over
Minister's order to commit fraud ", Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 11 June 1995. Christopher Clapham contends,
though, that "Corruption, given the wealth of the economy, has remained discernibly lower than in Kenya, let alone
Nigeria" {"Mugabe captains ship, often in stormy winds". Vie Star, 2 May, 1995).Corruption and maladministration
are considered to be especially rife in the expanding parastatal sector which became in the 1970s the major source
of political patronage (see: Jeffrey Herbst, "Political impediments to economic rationality: Explaining Zimbabwe's
failure to reform its public sector", Journal of Modem African Studies, 27 1 (1989), pp. 67-84).
a reflection of the government's priorities in distributing food-aid40 as well as lingering
sentiment originally generated in the predominantly rural Chimurenga41. One conspicuous
carryover from the UDI period is the state's authoritarian susceptibilities42. Nominally liberal
representative democracy co-exists uneasily with the hegemonic aspirations of a political elite
inclined to conflate party and state structures43. Regimented trade unions and a tightly
disciplined publicly owned press help the government to deflect social pressure as does a
brutal but generally well organised security establishment. In the 1990s the Zimbabwean
state may find it difficult to match its early achievements: recession, debt, and structural
adjustment have curtailed its resources and its coordinating and managerial capacities look
increasingly questionable. The strength of the Zimbabwean state is historically the product
of intense social and regional conflict; during the last decades of colonialism international
isolation and a war economy served as impetuses in the consolidation of administrative reach.
As conflict has receded so has the competence of an increasingly indebted government,
compelled to cede sovereignty to multilateral lending agencies in return for the resources
needed to fund social services.
Not all of southern Africa's "hard" states owe their formation to settler colonialism. The
peculiar characteristics of Batswana governance are traceable to an unusually successful
application of indirect rule. precepts to an advanced tributary social formation. This
facilitated a smooth transfer of power from the colonial administration to a cattle ranching
aristocracy. Even in comparison with other African colonies British administration in
Botswana was negligent (significantly, its headquarters was located in South Africa) and this
helps to explain unusually low rates of urbanisation and literacy during the colonial period;
in the run-up to independence modernist nationalist challenges to the moral authority of
Batswana chiefs were comparatively weak. Chiefs themselves were accumulators of
considerable wealth Through individual ownership of cattle and water boreholes, as early
as the 1930s they constituted a recognisable rural bourgeoisie44. Their power was also
attributable to a historic pattern of nucleated settlement in very large villages as well as the
Fleming, "The Zimbabwe election that never was", TJie Star, 20 March, 1996, p. 23.
'Though the dynamics of rural political affiliation were complex: see Norma Kriger, Zimbabwe's Guerilla War:
Peasant Voices, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992. On class structure and electoral choice: R^hard
Saunders, "Life in Space - The New Politics of Zimbabwe", Southern African Review of Books, January-February,
1993, p. 20.
4
 With regard to managerial style these may have strengthened. Norma Kriger in a critique of Jeffrey herbst's
book describes "senior bureaucrats (who) often seek permission from superiors before granting interviews... nobody
is willing to make even minor decisions; hence minutiae get passed up the hierarchy to the politicians at the top"
(Norma Kriger and Richard Saunders, "Through a Glass Darkly", Southern African Review of Books, March-April
1963, p. 21).
43Moyo. op cit, pp. 325-326.
^Kenneth Good, "Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana", Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 1
(1992), p. 72.
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population's increasing dependence upon pumped subterranean water45.
Mainland Africa's oldest liberal democracy, the continuities in Botswana political history are
the effect of conservative fiscal and social policies pursued by a governing elite' Very slow
rates of bureaucratic "localisation" has helped to socially insulate the state apparatus and may
explain the relative absence of official venality46. In 1985 one third of senior administrative
positions in Botswana were held by foreigners47. The political elite has used the state as an
instrument to consolidate its wealth and social dominance but in contrast to many sub-Saharan
the state has not served as a primary vehicle of capital accumulation for its governors. State
intervention in the economy is restricted, selective, and judicious. Rapid economic growth
has been facilitated by the discovery and exploitation of diamonds which through a joint
equity agreement with de Beers yields substantial revenues. These enable the government
to maintain a budgetary surplus and implement welfare policies which promote social control
without checking the income inequalities accentuated by economic policies which have
effectively concentrated cattle and land ownership. Drought relief was one welfare
dimension of government quite well developed under colonialism: in 1965 "food for work"
programmes reached 65 per cent of the population48. Today Botswana maintains what are
by African standards unusually high levels of social security for its rural citizenry: critics
note that this is the main form of government expenditure in the countryside aside from
election-linked improvements in rural infrastructure49. Educational provision has raised
literacy levels from ten per cent in 1965 to 35 per cent three decades later, a calculatedly
modest performance50.
About eighteen thousand people are employed by central and local government, about a third
of those employed in the private sector51. In rural areas many of the administrative structures
of colonialism remain. District commissioner supervise chiefs, function as security officers
and review the operation of customary law courts. Chiefs exercise limited legal authority
and considerable informal influence through traditional community assemblies, kgotlas.
45Ricliard VengrofF, Botswana: Rural Development in the Sliadow of Apartheid, Associated Universities Press,
Cranbury, New Jersey, 1966, p. 15.
46M Wallis, Vie Institutional Response to Drought, Study Paper no. 5, Food Studies Group, Oxford. 1990: N.
Raphaeli et al. Public Sector Management in Botswana, World Bank, Washington, 1984, Adrian Leftwich. "Bringing
Politics back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State', Journal of Development Studies, 31, 3, 1995, p.
414.
4
 Mplio Molomo and Brian Mokopakgosi (eds.), Multi-Party Democracy in Botswana, Southern African
Political economy Series, Harare, 1991, pp. 30-37.
4SLouis A Picard, Hie Politics of Development in Botswana, Lynne Reiner, Boulder, 1987, p. 235.
49Guod, op cit, p. 77; Roger Charlton, "The Politics of Elections in Botswana", Africa, 63 (3), 1993, p. 342.
5uMnlomo and Mokapakgasi, op cit, p. 8.
5lPicard, op cit, p. 161.
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Elected local government administers programmes which have increasingly privatised public
commonage. Real power in setting and implementing policy is held by a small political and
administrative elite numbering at most a few hundred. Sophisticated and competent
administration, controlled and discriminating social investments, fiscal rectitude and
economic good fortune have been the chief ingredients in the development of Botswana's
strong state, a state formed around an unusually stratified precolonial social order. Rising
social inequalities, accelerating urbanisation, increasing electoral challenge, and a growing
incidence of corruption in high places52 suggest that some of the threads in this tightly knit
political system are beginning to unravel.
Like Botswana, the formation of the modern Swazi state owes much to a decolonisation
process in which pre-colonial political authority emerged politically ascendent, its legitimacy
enhanced by the monarchy's struggle to resist land alienation to white settlers. The presence
of the settlers themselves ensured the growth of a sophisticated large scale commercial
agricultural sector which in the 1950s benefitted from $79 million invested by the Colonial
Development Corporation53. During the 1950s monarchists and settlers formed an alliance
based on constitutional power-sharing. South African private sector support and chiefly
power over land allocation within the royal domain helped the monarchist Imbokdovo
national movement to prevail over weakly articulated democratic nationalism. King
Sobhuza's denunciation of strikers in 1962 won British government approval and
multinational corporate backing; a British army battalion flown in from Kenya guarantied a
decorous transition to independence in 1968.
The contemporary Swazi state is a hybrid affair, a modest conventional bureaucracy,
employing 8,000 in 1981, 3,000 of whom were teachers and as many soldiers54, and a royal
parastatal corporation, the Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, a shareholding enterprise which deploys the
revenues paid to the royal house by companies which operate within the royal domain, about
half the territory55. These funds are kept separate from the government budget which is
chiefly derived from the income generated by the Southern African Customs Union36. R13
million customs revenues were lost in a major corruption scandal, one of several during the
52KennethGood, "The Ends of die Ladder: Radical Inequality in Boiswana", Journal of Modem AJricati Studies,
31, 2, (1993), pp. 225-227.
53Cliristian Potholm, Swxtziland: the Dynamics of Political Modernization, University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1972, p. 34.
^Robert Davies, Dan O'Meara, and Sipho Dlainini, Vie Kingdom of Swaziland: A Profile, Zed Press, London,
1985, p. 43.
55Davjes, O'Meara and Dlamini, op tit, pp. 17-21.
56Alan Booth, Swaziland: Tradition and Gtange in a Southern African Kingdom, Westview Press, Boulder,
1983, p. 103.
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1980s57. Eight per cent economic growth, largely a consequence of manufacturing
investment by foreign companies barred by sanctions from direct involvement in South
Africa, helped the government to balance its books despite official malfeasance; in 1993 the
first appearance of a budget deficit prompted efforts at bureaucratic reform58. Comparative
development indicators suggest that the state has been reasonably successful in broadening
public access to services and welfare: excluding Indian Ocean islands Swaziland has the
fourth highest UN HDI rating in sub-Saharan Africa (after Botswana, South Africa and
Gabon, the third highest secondary school enrolment (after Botswana and Zimbabwe) and is
in the top ten African countries for child immunization rates (98 per cent)59. From 1978 a
nominated parliament and cabinet take their marching orders from the king's council, the
Liqoqo. a body which became very powerful indeed during the lengthy regency which
succeeded Sobhuza's death in 1979. Factional struggles within the Liqoqo led to several
purges of potentially disloyal civil servants. Notwithstanding the accession to office of a
personable and popular young king, Mswati, continuing secrecy, intrigue, and the patrimonial
privatisation of national resources are likely to hamper any public sector housecleaning.
The modern Basotho state was also built around a precolonial monarchy but during the
colonial period the erosion of those institutions which sustained royal power, matsema labour
service and mafisa cattle loans, as a consequence of growing land shortage and labour
migration left the royal house in much less commanding position than the Dlaminis in
Swaziland. Nationalist claims to leadership were divided between a protestant educated elite
and junior chiefs who had lost formal office through colonial administrative reforms. The
chiefs' Basotho National Party won the pre-independence election in 1965 with support from
the South African government and local Roman Catholic clergy and presided over the
Basotho polity for the next thirty years, filling its senior echelons with retired South African
civil servants60 until it could replace these in the 1970s with its own loyal cadres. The BNP's
leader, Leabua Jonathan Molapo, was a senior representative of a cadet branch of the
Basotho Royal House and this lent a dynastic dimension to tense relations between the King
and the government. From 1970, BNP rule was unconstitutional, upheld after an annulled
election by the Police Mobile Unit, Lesotho's fledgling army. Recruitment to this force
quickened in the 1980s and within it BNP membership became compulsory under the
"sephepechane" system, notwithstanding the government's constitutional pretensions to
embodying an "all-party" democracy.
Lesotho's economic dependence was reflected in its rulers' administrative and fiscal reliance
on foreign powers; this has posed a particular problem for state legitimation as well as
causing sharp oscillations in government policy particularly with respect to relations with
South Africa. International aid to Lesotho increased sharply in the 1980s and after customs
5
 Da vies ci al, op cit, pp. 66-67.
5SChristina Lamb. "Wind of change blowing through Africa's Ruritania", TJie Star, 10 June, 1995.
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receipts dispensed from Pretoria became the second source of government income.
Arguably, this may help to explain the irresponsibility which characterised the management
of public finance during the BNP regime and its successor. An officially suppressed auditors
report on public accounts between 1975 and 1978 found that lethargy, inefficiency and
dishonesty permeated every branch of the civil service61. Bad management of public accounts
predated independence but the bureaucracy's weaknesses were accentuated by the systematic
removal from its ranks of relatively well qualified BCP supporters after 1970. To be fair
to Jonathan's administration, the dismissal of BCP loyalists from the civil service was partly
justified by hostility and obstructionism to his government within the bureaucracy openly
manifest well before 197062.
Whatever its shortcomings, Leabua Jonathan's government presided over a considerable
enlargement of the state's authority between 1966 and 1986. This was not difficult given the
unimpressive legacy of colonial state building. Even by British standards, the colonial
bureaucracy was modest in scope, delegating responsibility for almost all education to three
missionary organisations who between them achieved the proportionately highest primary
enrolment in Africa63. Traders were given the responsibility of maintaining "Class C" roads,
400 miles out of a total network of 960 in 196564. Per capita state expenditure was about one
third of Swaziland's in the early 1960s, and despite the recent availability of greater
quantities of development aid half of the state's revenues were absorbed by salaries65. One
indicator of the limitations of colonial state reach was the efficacy of personal tax collection;
in I960 officials believed that tax yields were about a third of their potential level66. Nearly
two thirds of government revenues for 1965/66 derived from British aid, an unusually high
proportion even in colonial Africa67. From the end of the Second World War much of this
aid was expended on anti erosion measures, involving the construction of 26,717 miles of
contour terracing, the main effect of which was to concentrate water so as to considerably
expand its capacity to remove top soil at specific points in the landscape68. From this modest
base line the post colonial state's administrative scope and economic embrace expanded to
61Paul Wellings, "Making a fast buck: capital leakage and public accounts in Lesotho", African Affairs, 82,329,
October 1983, pp. 495-507.
62GahrieIle Strom, op tit, p. 89.
6iBasutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, and Swaziland: Report of an Economic Survey Mission, HMSO,
London, 1960, p. 251.
** Report of the. Secretary General on Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, United National General
Assembly, New York, 25 August, 1965, p. 130.
65John Bardill and James Cobbe, Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa, Wetsview, Boulder,
1985, p.49.
^Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, pp. 218-219.
67Bardill and Cobbe, op tit, p. 49.
68KateShowers, "Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho", Journal ofSouthern African Studies, 152January
1989, p. 285.
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include the direct administration of education from 1976, the creation of a commercial land
market after the revision of traditional land tenure in 1979, and its foreign aid supported
developmental role in the countryside. The 1969 revision in the Customs Union significantly
boosted public revenues enabling Jonathan to build up army and extend the field of public
patronage through the proliferation of parastatals. Local tax collection was improved with
the institution of a local PA YE system in 1970. fiy 1984 public sector employment had
reached 21,000, three times its 1971 figures69, and there were over fifty public
corporations70. In 1968 the BNP administration abolished elected local government,
removing official sanction from the 3,000 or so bodies which had been established during the
terminal colonial phase and which had begin to assume the control over land allocation
hitherto exercised by chiefs. During the early 1970s the local state was reconstructed around
bureaucratically appointed committees under chiefly chairmanship71.
By the 1980s Basotho political leadership was fragmented by intense factionalism caused by
the competing claims of different sources of state legitimacy, rival sources of foreign
patronage, and ideological feuds within cabinet reflecting these. Jonathan's promotion of an
armed party youth wing and ascendency within his cabinet of a radical anti-apartheid faction
prompted a South African induced takeover by the Defence Force, a body now strongly
linked through kinship ties to the royal family. Rifts between the soldiers and the King
became evident in 1988 after an especially humiliating display of military incompetence in
which South African commandoes had to be summoned to rescue a hijacked busload of
pilgrims during a papal visit. Weakened by a series of corruption scandals the military
government finally conceded democratic elections in 1993, won by Leabua Jonathan's rival,
Ntsu Mokhehle, once an ally of the South African ANC, and later, through the interplay
between Basotho and regional politics, a beneficiary of Pretoria's destabilisation policies.
A heavily politicised army returned to its barracks but its internecine feuding in Maseru in
January 1994 and subsequent attempted deposition of Mokhehle's government underscored
the divisions which exist inside and between different state institutions in Lesotho.
In contrast to Swaziland and Lesotho, pre-colonial formations have had little impact on the
modern Zambian state: north of the Zambezi local polities at the end of the nineteenth
century were "recently formed, divided, and fluid"72. As with Lesotho, the colonial
bureaucracy represented weak foundations for state building: the copperbelt companies
developed their own style of paternalism towards a fairly settled labour force. The
construction of relatively attractive company towns made forced labour recruitment a less
important aspect of government policy in Northern Rhodesia than elsewhere in Southern
Africa; it also precluded the development of official welfare services. White farmers along
"the line of rail" supplied most marketed crops and hence the tiny Northern Rhodesian
Gabrielle Strom, Migration and Development; A Study of Lesotho, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies,
Uppsala, 1986, p. 87.
701996 figures, cited in Business Day, 17 April, 1996.
7lGahrielle Strom, op cit, pp. 80-84.
"Robert Molteno, "Cleavage and conflict in Zambian politics" in William Tordoff(ed.). Politics in Zambia,
Manchester University Press, 1974, p, 69.
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bureaucracy had little time for peasant farming and rural development schemes, even after
World War Two73. As a consequence of its subordinate position in the Central African
Federation, Northern Rhodesia was hardly affected by post war reforms in British colonial
policy and it attained independence in 1964 with less educated manpower than any
comparable British territory74. High rates of proletarianisation and urban growth, a result
of the mining economy, were reflected, though, in a surprisingly powerful nationalist
movement, the United National Independence Party, one which through the continuing social
linkages between urban workers and their rural families managed to penetrate deeply, if
unevenly through the countryside. Four years after independence, UNIP could muster 463
branches in Luapula province, one for every 350 adults75.
Ensconced in power through a modified Westminster constitution which invested huge powers
in an executive presidency, filled from independence by former schoolteacher Kenneth
Kaunda, UNIP lost no time in implementing an ambitious programme of state expansion.
Primary school enrolment doubled in four years to 600,000 and new secondary schools
enlisted another 200,00076, enabling the authorities to "Africanise" the civil service quite
rapidly, though whites continued to predominate in the senior ranks through the 1960s. High
copper prices and subsequent revenues permitted the state to spend generously: public
expenditure leapt from K91m to K553 between 1963 and 197177. Copper revenues also
enabled the government to purchase majority shareholdings in 26 foreign owned companies
in 1968, the two main copper corporations in 1969, and building societies and insurance
firms in 1970. These nationalisations created a vast parastatal sector which employed about
a third of the wage earning workforce. Though many of the seventy or so state companies
continued to be managed by their former owners under political direction they became
increasingly less effective commercially, serving as reservoirs of patronage, and, more
worthily, investing in government industrial decentralisation projects as well as supplying
heavily subsidised services and commodities78.
Until 1972 Zambia was a multiparty democracy, with party rivalries mainly reflecting the
historical variations in the timing and degree of integration of different regions into the
central economy. Even during the First Republic (1964-1971), UNIP began to assign
political office bearers to positions customarily held by civil servants, most notably through
the creation of a new political head of the civil service, the Secretary General to the
Government. Political appointments helped the civil service to grow from 22, 561 in 1964
3Stephen Quick, "Bureaucracy and rural socialism in Zambia', Journal of Modern African Studies, 15, 3
(1977), p. 381.
74WiIliam Tordoff, "Introduction" in Tordoff, op cit, 1974, p. 8.
Molteno; op cit, p. 99.
76Molteno, op cit, p. 103.
William Tordoff and Robert Molteno, "Government and Administration' in Tordoff, op cit, 1974, p. 243.
Ben Turok, "Zambia's system of state capitalism", Development and Change, 11, 1980, p. 470.
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to 51,497 in 196979, UNIP subscriptions were collected through government machinery,
enabling the party to develop its own paid bureaucracy, and, more significantly, a substantial
property portfolio80. In December 1971, a one party constitution was adopted, a response
to growing opposition to UNIP in the Southern and Western provinces as well as internal
party tensions. During the Second Republic the Office of the President expanded its powers
further, running several ministries directly, appointing UNIP central committee members,
constitutionally, the supreme policy-making group, and through nominations and party
vetting, playing a decisive role in the selection of parliamentarians. Party/state fusion reached
its furthest extent in the 1980 local government reforms when party structures replaced
elected district and municipal representative bodies.
During the 1970s, authoritarian reflexes in government already visible in the First Republic
became accentuated with the quickening incidence of preventative detention, state takeover
of the press in 1975, and academic repression. Even so, UNIP rule never represented
systematic tyranny. Kaunda's preferred way of dealing with his opponents was to give them
jobs, maintaining his popularity at the expense of an increasingly bloated bureaucracy.
Despite government efforts to control them, trade unions successfully resisted incorporation,
and both newspapers and parliamentary back-benchers functioned as a loyal opposition
through the Second Republic^ extending their criticisms to include not only abuses but
precepts of official policy. Limits to authoritarianism were also defined by the state's
restricted reach. This was especially the case in the countryside. Colonial indirect rule
authorities were dismantled in 1965 leaving the 250 or so paid traditional chiefs with mainly
ceremonial functions. In the place of colonial native authorities in 1971 the government
installed a hierarchy of development committees. Three years later researchers found an
"institutional vacuum" at village level with less than ten per cent of the Village Development
Committees functioning in certain districts81. More recently, it has become evident in the
countryside, especially in the western region that the state's moral authority is mainly
dependent upon revitalised ethnic lineages, boosted in certain areas by agricultural schemes
launched by parastatals82. State reach was also consolidated from 1974 by the system of
uniform producer prices and transport subsidies instituted by Namboard, the state marketing
authority for maize; these generally benefitted peasant farmers in the most remote areas83.
Zambian state development was fuelled by booming cooper revenues. When the price of
copper fell after 1971 foreign loans replaced copper revenues as the mainstay of government
expansion: by 1985 the IMF had lent more to Zambia than any other African state, partly
as a consequence of its perceived strategic significance in Southern African regional
79Tordoff and Molteno, op tit, p. 273.
^'William Tordoff and Ian Scott, "Political Parties" in William Tordoff, op tit, 1974, p. 126.
8lMichael Bratton, "The social context of political penetration: village and ward committees in Kasama District"
in William Tordoff (ed.), Administration in Zamiria, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1980, p. 237.
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conflicts*4. Compelled to embrace a harsh structural adjustment programme that year,
including the removal of consumer and producer subsidies state authority underwent sharp
contraction, signified in the growth of cross border smuggling, labour protest, middle class
disaffection, and the virtual collapse of rural government in many regions: by 1988 half the
55 district councils had ceased to function as had most of the agricultural processing
parastatal enterprises. Public social expenditure declined by one third in real terms between
1984 and 199185. Policy oscillations between conformity, defiance and then again conformity
with IMF prescriptions engendered party revolt and the formation of a Movement for Multi-
Party Democracy by a coalition of former UNIP notables, especially from the West,
businessmen and trade unionists. Constitutional revisions permitted multiparty elections in
1991 and an MMD victory; since then ex-trade unionist Frederick Chiluba has presided over
a programme of state divestment86 and deindustrialization, with 70,000 retrenchments in the
parastatals87. However Chiluba's administration has been unable to afford the cost of large-
scale dismissals in the civil service whose numbers today stand at 180 00088. While social
services contract a new Zambia Revenue Authority has been established with the intention
of collecting 22 per cent of GDP through income tax and a new introduced 20 per cent
VAT89.
The Zambian state system's social orientation helps us to understand both its shortcomings
and its merits. Its predominance in the political economy of the First and Second Republics
was mainly a consequence of an unusually stunted class formation at independence. Inheriting
a particularly weak colonial administration, Kaunda's governments built their authority
through expanding programmes of public employment, welfare, and subsidies. A new class
of entrepreneurs developed around senior bureaucratic echelons in the civil service,
increasingly immune from challenge by party populists after the 1971 constitution replaced
politics with government. The state ideology of "Humanism" while helping to promote the
allocation of public resources to the countryside did little to check accumulation at the centres
of administrative power. Civil servants ignored the official leadership code to combine
public office with private interest. Kaunda's own predisposition for personal intervention
inhibited the development of institutionalised checks on corruption, waste and inefficiency
as did his habit of controlling elite factionalism and checking aspirant rivals through the
constant reshuffling of appointments and positions. In Chiluba's Third Republic liberal
democracy has at best served as a partial brake on senior echelon misbehaviour: in 1993
several ministers were implicated in the private diversion of credits from state institutions.
Kenneth Good, "Debt and the one-party state in Zambia", Journal ofModem African Studies, 27,2,1989.
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The existence of a large and well organised working class manifestly capable of independent
mobilisation helped for thirty years to restrict the scope of government bullying and ensure
a reasonably equitable distribution of public resources: this force is now diminishing rapidly.
No such social restraints checked the accumulation of state power in post-colonial Malawi,
for here historical patterns of proletarianisation have taken place chiefly through migrant
labour export to Zimbabwe and South Africa. Malawi's thirty year dictatorship built upon
a colonial system of administration which it kept virtually unchanged. A brief reformist era
in government policy was rapidly brought to a halt under Hastings Banda, a former general
practitioner in London and a presbyterian church elder, who invested in the executive even
greater powers than it had enjoyed under colonialism (when it allowed a modicum of political
representation to the 7,000 settlers and after 1948 to educated Africans). After the pre-
independence elections of 1964 (in which all the candidates of the Malawi Congress Party
were unopposed) no further polls were held until 1978 when each candidate had to be
approved by Dr Banda. Constitutional laws in 1966 and 1971 instituted a one party state and
conferred upon the president powers which would allow him to nominate nearly half of
parliament and appoint his cabinet from outside the legislature. In 1971 legal reforms
expanded the capacity of neo-traditional courts and gave to the president the authority to
determine what constituted traditional law90. Four years earlier a land law made the
president the ultimate landowner of all Malawian land.
Post-independence patrimonialism echoed colonial policy. In contrast to neighbouring
Zambia, the Malawian state allocated meagre resources to welfare and instead concentrated
expenditure on economic activity and infrastructure. By 1980, next to Somalia, Malawi had
the smallest proportion of its children attending secondary school in sub-Saharan Africa but
its national gross capital formation, mostly attributable to state activity, was relatively for
Africa very high. Deliberately slow "Africanisation" of senior civil service ranks helped to
maintain policy continuities. Most investment was in and around agriculture in which both
the state and parastatals were busy boosting the fortunes of an African rural bourgeoisie who
inherited the ownership and management of the tea and tobacco plantations maintained
previously by settlers (excluded from the countryside in 1979). As a financial manager the
Malawian state gained a reputation for efficiency among foreign donors and investors91 and
indeed corruption was limited to the semi-institutionalised spoliation of public resources by
Banda and his inner circle. State extension services also helped a yeoman farmer group to
prosper, a continuity in emphasis from British development programmes in the fifties, but
only reached twenty per cent of the poorest group of peasant producers. Independent
marketing cooperatives, dating from the same period were quickly absorbed into state
controlled marketing authorities and the communal lands in which the most lively peasant
organisations existed were chosen to accommodate the Malawi Young Pioneers' agricultural
settlement schemes. The structure and composition of rural production remained unchanged
from the 1950s and government marketing boards ensured that richer groups enjoyed
^T David Williams, Malawi: Tlie Politics of Despair, Cornell, Ithaca, 1978.
91
 Denis Venter, Malawi towards multiparty democracy, Political Science Association of South Africa Research
Colloquium, Bruederstroom, 8-9 October, 1992, p. 3.
19
production monopolies in the more profitable export crops. Many of the 9,000 bigger
commercial farms were owned by Press Holdings, the business wing of the Malawi Congress
Party, in effect a presidential private estate, others were shared by senior bureaucrats and
Mps. In 1967 a special fund was instituted to finance purchases of land leases by these
groups. A mainly publicly owned manufacturing sector concentrated upon the early stages
of agricultural commodity processing, its operations facilitated by anti strike legislation and
very low state-prescribed wage levels. State industrialisation policies were cautious; Malawi
did not promote import substitution vigorously and levels of tariff protection for infant
manufacturers were by African standards very low. The formal government bureaucracy
expanded slowly growing by a modest 70 per cent between 1969 and 1989 (general wage
sector employment trebled in this period). In 1988, government employment totalled 88,000
including 7,000 soldiers and 5,000 policemen, representing twenty per cent of the wage
earning population92. State finances depended increasingly upon indirect taxation, forty per
cent of revenues in 198093.
Expanded production and good prices facilitated high growth rates until 1980 helped to
ensure that few popular challenges emerged to Banda's authority94. This was in any case
upheld by a an organisational complex with a capacity for social penetration which has been
characterised as totalitarian. The Young Pioneers played an important role in this respect
beginning in 1964 when they helped to suppress a civil service pay mutiny. Thereafter they
were armed and equipped with both powers and exemption from arrest. Trained originally
by the Israelis and modelled on the Ghanaian youth movement and employed as agricultural
demonstrators and ancillary teachers they constituted a most intimidating national network
of spies and informers95. For a predominantly rural society nationalist organisation during
decolonisation achieved a quite unusual degree of mobilisation - the MCP managed to
persuade two million voters to register in the week before the 1964 election - and this may
help to explain the subsequent extent of state reach96. The state's capabilities were evident
also in the high proportion of the population with access to state primary health care facilities
- 80 per cent in 1991, according to the UNDP, though household poverty and government
parsimony ensured that general health standards remained low97. An expanding domestic
working class, much of it located in private agriculture, worsening terms of trade, declining
^'Economist Intelligence Unit, Malawi Country Profile, 1992/1993, London, 1993, p. 14.
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. 20
crop yields, growing land shortages, and Banda's deteriorating health each contributed to the
unravelling of state authority. In early 1992, protest by the Roman Catholic hierarchy (half
the population is Catholic), student demonstrations, labour unrest, and riots directed at shops
owned by Press Holdings helped to prompt a limited liberalisation through the rest of 1992,
a referendum on the one party state in May 1993 and elections the following year. These
removed the MCP from government and confirmed'its status as a regional party. With the
enforced disbanding of the Young Pioneers by a mutinous army in December 1993, the work
of dismantling Banda's "authoritarian leviathan"98 had already begun. More systematically,
Bakili MaluzPs new government withdrew the public subsidy from Banda College and
instituted free primary education. Classroom demand prompted an expansion of the teaching
force, much of it fictional as educationists and civil servants paid themselves double salaries
by creating "ghost workers" at schools. World Bank pressure prompted the administration
to announce 30,000 retrenchments from the public service, estimated to total 105,000 in
1992W. To enforce cut-backs the Reserve Bank transferred ministerial accounts to foreign
private banks to take advantage of their strict supervision pf overdraft facilities and a new
regulation imposes dismissals on officials signing bad cheques100. Meanwhile the government
has economised on the food subsidies instituted by the Banda administration during the mid-
1980s recession and has established an Anti-Corruption Commission. The existence of this
body did not deter Maluzi's cabinet from authorising the distribution of $3,200 to each of
the ruling party's parliamentary representatives, using funding earmarked for poverty relief.
On a more positive note, press criticism of such excesses (in eleven new newspapers) and
the rising incidence of rural crime suggest that the repressive predisposition of the Malawian
has diminished considerably.
Until the 1960s Portuguese colonial state structures in Southern Africa were skeletal. In
Mozambique, outside the main towns until 1933 the authorities often delegated administration
and development to the British concessionary companies which predominated in the North
and the Zambezi valley. 43 districts, or circumscricaos were each split up into between two
and six posts, each managed by the most junior ranking Portuguese official, a Chefede Posto
and his African subordinates, the regutos and cabos. Chefe de Postos collected taxes,
dispensed justice and supervised agriculture: each had up to 40,000 subjects under his
jurisdiction101. White settlers elected advisory municipal governments as well as a
consultative legislative assembly with corporatist representation. Railway profits and
capitation fees on South African migrant labour contracts provided the basis of colonial
public finance: these did not allow for lavish expenditure particularly under the monetarist
Salazar regime which had as its first colonial priority in 1933 the reduction of huge
government debts run up by its predecessor. Official parsimony helped to confine the stope
of government authority despite the totalitarian dimensions of the highly centralised Salazarist
state: these included secret police, censorship and rigid state control of education.•- Coerced
The phrase is Guy Mhone's, op tit, p. 8.
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cotton cultivation and forced labour represented more conventional manifestations of
authoritarian colonialism: all adult males of working age had to undertake six months of paid
labour. Given the low ratio of officials to the local population the intensity of the labour
regime varied; in the case of cotton cultivation each employee of the state's Junta da
Exportacao deAlgoada was entrusted with the supervision of 10,000 growers102. In the 1950s
government social expenditure began to rise with the'introduction of primary health care and
immunization schemes103; however public expenditure on development remained relatively
modest even when directed at recently established white rural settler communities in the
Zambezi valley. The colonial civil service was historically corrupt and poorly paid and only
began to acquire a degree of prestige after reforms instituted in the 1950s. By 1963 the
bureaucracy employed 115,000 people, half of them Portuguese I04 State reach expanded
with the onset of counter insurgency in 1964. In the next ten years the road network doubled,
one million peasants were crowded into fortified villages and school enrolment nearly
trebled, to thirty per cent105.
Decolonisation and settler exodus created a political vacuum which was only partially filled
by the new FRELIMO leadership. Within the civil service remaining white functionaries,
many of them communists, at first held disproportionate influence, while in the factories and
other enterprises abandoned by their former owners self-appointed "dynamising groups" of
activists exercised managerial control106. By 1977 and its Third Congress, FRELIMO was
ready to reimpose centralised direction with the help of freshly trained party cadres.
However most state functionaries remained badly under-trained; in the late 1980s only 15 per
cent had any post-secondary education and a third had only attended primary school. In the
countryside the African subordinates to the departed Chefe de Postos were brushed aside as
102MalynNewitt, Portugal in Africa, Longman, Harlow, 1981,p. 184. Newitt believes that "in general...the
picture is one of a very inefficient and partial (labour) mobilisation" (op cit, p. 115). Other authorities contend that
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traitors, irrespective of any local legitimacy the regulors or cabos may have retained107. In
the place of colonial judicial arrangements a hierarchy of courts was established with 800
people's tribunals at its base which elected their own judges. These attempted at first to
administer a more humane form of rehabilitative justice but efforts in constructing a new
legal order were undermined by the powers of imprisonment given to the new security
agency, SNASP, the introduction of flogging in 1983 and the summary expulsion of 50,000
unemployed from the cities108. SNASP, established in 1975, with 1,500 East German trained
officers, was claimed to command by 1984 a network of "People's Vigilance Groups"
numbering 300,000109.
The Congress adopted Marxism-Leninism as a state ideology and vanguardist modes of party
organisation and recruitment. Whatever autonomous associations existed were replaced with
a party-sponsored range of functional organisations. A People's Assembly was appointed
which lent support to a programme intended to tap rural resources through collective
production so as to accumulate the surplus for investment in heavy industry. In effect,
Frelimo's state-led agricultural development succeeded merely in concentrating resources
under the control of state structures incapable of deploying them effectively. In the process
"middle peasants" who had been minor beneficiaries of the last decade of colonial rule were
dispossessed and alienated, often themselves constituting a discontented and corrupt bottom
layer in the management of the state's agricultural projects. In 1981 not one state farm was
profitable110. Meanwhile the failure of government efforts to persuade peasants to form
producer cooperatives in the northern areas which during the war had been most thoroughly
penetrated by FRELIMO guerillas also signalled the limits of the state's capacity for social
engineering in the countryside; only five of the five hundred or so former liberated
settlements formed producer cooperatives: by 1982 a meagre total of 37,000 peasants
participated in such efforts111. Peasants were further demoralised by a state marketing
10
 A range of commentators believe that the dismissal of these functionaries was a mistake. See William
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inmates of reeducation camps is cited in David Hoile's Mozambique: A Nation in Crisis (Claridge Press. London,
1989. p. 36) hue this seems very inflated. Usually both hostile and sympathetic commentaries estimate the numbers
held in reeducation camps as totalling around 10,000 ( for example, Harold Nelson, op cit, p. 65). Flogging was
abolished in 1989. 62 convicted criminals were publicly executed between 1979 and 1983 but after 1986 the death
penalty was not imposed (William Finnegan, Mozambique: A Complicated War, California University Press,
Berkeley, 1991, p. 123).
"
wSuch claims (Nelson, op cit, pp. 293) should be treated with circumspection. Hanlon {op cit, 1984, p. 39)
gives a more modest figure of 100,000. The vigilance network was concentrated in towns, well away from areas
of RENAMO infiltration, and probably directed much of its energies against people who did not represent serious
security threats, for example, the six university students flogged in 1983 for starting up a subversive association (see
Nelson, op cit, pp. 279-293).
""Joseph Hanlon, The Revolution under Fire, Zed Press, London, p.101.
1
' 'Clarence-Smith, op cit, p, 7. The history of the Northern Cooperatives under the Frelimo administration
is traced in Judith Marshall and Otto Roesch, "The Green Zones Agricultural Cooperatives of nampula City: A New
23
monopoly which paid them low prices for their produce and failed to maintain the rural retail
outlets left behind by the departing Portuguese. In fairness, attempts to reorganise
production were accompanied by a considerable expansion of health services and education:
primary and secondary school enrolment had by 1982 doubled school attendance in 1973 and
a WHO survey suggested in the same year that 62 per cent of rural children had been
vaccinated against TBi12 South African-backed R£NAMO units repeatedly attacked rural
schools and clinics and these figures began to decline thereafter.
Democratic centralism and eastern European administrative styles (the East Germans helped
to reorganise the secret police) merely reinforced the authoritarian bureaucratic tradition
created by the Portuguese. Intensifying villagisation, affecting 1,800 000 people by 1982,
accompanied by campaigns against "feudalism, obscurantism and tribalism" help to generate
rural support for the RENAMO insurgency113. The first major wave of village formation was
facilitated by floods in the late 1970s. Thereafter homestead-burning and the withholding of
food aid helped to swell the number of village population. As the numbers of villages
increased it became increasingly difficult for the state to provide their inhabitants with goods
and services. Land shortages created through the concentration of farmers and their removal
from land assigned to state farms helped to intensify the traditional social domination of
lineage elders. Civil war destroyed the rail links, helping to shrink a revenue base already
depleted by the contraction of migrant labour employment in South Africa and increasingly
depleted by military expenditure. Government policies helped South Africa's proxy armies
find their recruits and the Mozambican military proved to be most ineffectual in combatting
them. Reorganised along Soviet lines in 1979 in anticipation of large scale hostilities from
South Africa its miserably treated 30,000 conscripts deserted en masse and most of the
effective fighting was undertaken by soldiers from the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian armies.
In 1985 Portuguese counter-insurgency experts joined forces with the Zimbabweans and the
Mozambicans in combatting RENAMO114
Phase in the Mozambican Cooperative Movement", Journal of Southern African Studies, 19, 2, 1993. Around
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FRELIMO's Fourth Congress acknowledged shortcomings in agricultural policy and the
larger state undertakings began to be dismantled. However despite the policy revisions which
resulted from the Congress115, the shrinking of the state farm sector was very slow. In 1986,
the official magazine Tempo reported an angry meeting between peasants in Gaza and the
provincial governor: "what kind of state is this which takes away our lands and gives them
to state farms which do not even cultivate them", tKe governor was asked. The same year
the government began to enforce export crop cultivation in Nampula: "Producing cotton or
cashew nuts is not a request but an order from the state"116. Bureaucratic predispositions to
commandist methods were strengthened by the entrenchment from 1979 onwards of a upper
bureaucratic echelon of technocrats, concentrated in the secretive and powerful National
Planning Council, who had decisive influence over investment decisions as well as enjoying
together with other senior civil servants significant material privileges including official cars,
access to special shops, and private hospital wards. From 1987, a structural adjustment
programme followed IMF prescriptions: these measures included a quartering of the
education budget and the elimination of food subsidies. Social services were reduced from
a quarter of the government's expenditure to 3,2 per cent while military spending rose to 35
per cent of the budget in 1990. Overall state expenditure had already in the period 1981-
1986 contracted by 5$ per cent117. Shrinking revenues and World bank prescriptions checked
state expansion: in 1990 the civilian public service numbered 105,000, smaller than the
colonial service and the public impact of government services was only 70 per cent the
average for Anglophone Sub-Saharan Africa118.
In 1990 a new constitution introduced multiparty democracy and the task of uncoupling state
and party structures began, facilitated in some cases by highly personalised forms of
privatisation of publ ic assets by senior officials and pol iticians. A series of financial scandals
suggest an increasing scale of bureaucratic venality; in one government department, the main
agency interfacing with foreign donors, misappropriation of funds may have represented fifty
per cent of income 119. An array of new foreign funded NGO's often staffed by former
public servants now replace state agencies in supplying services and developmental resources
1I5On the decisions of the Fourth Congress and their implementation: Merle Bowen, "Beyond Reform:
Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique", Journal of Modern African Studies, 30 2, 1992,
pp. 255-279 and Mark Simpson, "Foreign and Domestic factors in the Transformation of FREUMO", Journal of
Modern African Studies, 31 2, 1992, pp. 309-337.
116Both quotations from Clarence-Smith, op cit, pp. 7-8.
'"Judith Marshall, War, Debt and Structural Adjustment in Mozambique, North/South Institute, Ottawa, 1991,
p. 12 and p. 29;Jens Erik Torp, L M Denny and Donald I Ray. Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe: Politics,
Economic and Society, Pinter Publishers, London, 1989, p. 38.
'"Marshall, op cit, p.50.
'"More generally, though, levels of corruption in the FREUMO administration remained relatively modest.
William Finnegan met a Greek businessman in maputo in 1988 who was trying to obtain a fishing license. The
minister who was prepared to lease a fleet of trawlers at $3,000 a day requested a mere $10 daily commission
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in the countryside120; meanwhile the state itself is heavily subsidised by the foreign aid which
also pays for 80 per cent of the country's imports. As a consequence of both externally
instigated civil war and policy mistakes two decades of independence have failed to
substantially extend the Mozambican's state's administrative capacity or its political authority
as well as demonstrating alarming continuities from colonial autocracy121.
The history of the Angolan state has close affinities with Mozambican experience. The
Portuguese bureaucracy was relatively smaller than in Mozambique, employing only 41,000
in 1965122, including contract workers, and delegating to a rather greater extent the provision
of welfare services, health and education to private agencies, including missionaries and
concessionary companies. As in Mozambique, with the onset of insurgency in the 1960s,
the state became rather more energetic in these fields as well as spending $100 million on
smallholder settlement schemes123. These latter were as unsuccessful as their counterparts
in Mozambique and fewer than 800 European families remained in them by 1968. However,
in displacing African peasant communities from their land on the Benguela plateau to
accommodate the schemes, the authorities succeeded in mobilising a popular following for
UNITA, one of three different regional nationalist organisations whose rival struggles for
supremacy would prolong the liberation war for the two decades following the Portuguese
departure. Official reforms which promoted a coffee growing African peasantry in the North
and the entry into the civil service of larger numbers of assimilados and mesticos helped to
enlarge the social bases of the two other insurgent organisations, respectively the mainly
Bakongo FNLA and the more urban-oriented marxist MPLA124. As a consequence of its
control of Luanda and its capacity to enlist powerful external allies, the MPLA assumed
command of the bureaucracy left behind by the Portuguese. Though depleted, much of this,
the MPLA's critics125 allege, was retained intact, notwithstanding the new government's
formal adoption of Leninist protocols. Old hierarchical habits may have been reinforced by
the presence within its ranks of 7,000 retornados, former Portuguese colonial officials
recruited from Lisbon126. Before 1974, the MPLA's guerilla army never exceeded more than
5,000 combatants. The movement's ranks swelled massively in 1975 but worker restiveness
l20For debate on the relative efficacy of foreign NGOs compared to the state see Marshall and Roesch, op cit
and Hanlon, Who calls the shots.
121For elaboration of this point see: Bertil Egero, Mozambique: A Dream Undone, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet,
Uppsala, 1990, pp. 186-189.
122David Abshire (ed.), Portuguese Africa: A Handbook, Pall, London, 1969, p. 170.
l23Gerald Bender, "Planned rural settlements in Angola", Franz-Wilhelm Heimer (ed.), Social Giange in
Angola, Weltforum Verlag, Munich, 1973.
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and subsequent disputes between the predominantly mestico leadership and an "Africanist"
faction led by a former Minister of the Interior, Nito Alves, prompted the purge of all but
16,000 of the MPLA's 110,000 membership of 1977. Afterwards state functionaries
predominated in the party until the army's growth in response to repeated South African
invasions supporting the UNITA insurgency shifted power in favour of the military.
In contrast to Mozambique, state politics in Angola have been most fractious. Internal
conflicts within the party and the bureaucracy were publicly attributed to the presence within
the new state of proto-bourgeois groupings or have been explained in principally ideological
terms127. An alternative view is that for the last twenty years competing Creole elites with
their roots either in the Portuguese civil service (mainly mestico) or in the colonial army
(largely African) have struggled for control of the Angolan state; from this perspective
historical continuities are more significant than ostensibly revolutionary ruptures and the new
state's inherited "softness" and "bureaucratism" more important than its guerilla
credentials128.
As in Mozambique the abandonment of enterprises in the exodus of 300,000 settlers led to
a rapid expansion of the public sector composed of state farms and factories which was to
be managed with conspicuous waste and dishonesty. Its own insecurity and internal
divisiveness may help to explain the MPLA's adherence to an especially intolerant and
dogmatic marxism-leninism: the various organs of representative government had an even
more perfunctory existence than their counterparts in Mozambique. "Transmission belt"
trade unions helped to promote social discipline and supposedly brought 600,000 workers
within the organisational embrace of the party/state. In the late 1970s the new state could
claim impressive advances in public health and education but the expansion of military
hostilities by South Africa and UNITA in the next decade would quickly eliminate gains.
During the 1980s, military expenditure absorbed about half the country's export earnings129.
This could be sustained because despite the contraction of the state's effective authority - in
1990, marketing authorities obtained only about 5 per cent of the maize crop - its main
source of income was offshore. Sensibly enough, the most skilled personnel were
concentrated in the management of the oil parastatal, SONANGOL130. An almost wholly
externally derived revenue doubtless encouraged increasingly ostentatious behaviour among
members of the senior administrative caste: by 1989 the annual bill for official journeys
abroad equalled the money expended on industrial material and food imports. By this stage
the state was rapidly divesting itself of its responsibilities, turning state farms over to the
workers for whom it could not afford wages to form cooperatives and inflating the local
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currency to pay its 120,000 conscript soldiers. The 20,000 Cuban soldiers and technicians
who supplied the most reliable underpinning of the state's authority were paid for with real
money, from the oil earnings. In 1990 the MPLA's abandonment of Marxism-Leninism
followed Angola's admission to the IMF and the World Bank and the pace of bureaucratic
disintegration accelerated.
Four criteria are helpful in assessing state capacity in developing countries: institutional
autonomy, social penetration, legitimate authority, and bureaucratic rationality. Autonomy
refers to the extent to which the state is distanced from society and can determine and
implement its policies unrestrained by particular social interests. Social penetration is evident
in the degree of control the state can exercise over society, its extractive capability, and the
extent to which it meets social needs. Authority can rest upon ideological and legitimating
devices as well as the effectiveness of repressive agencies. Bureaucratic rationality is
expressed in the relative absence of corruption, the existence of an institutional corporate
culture within state agencies, and the levels of professionalism and competence of civil
servants.
Until recently, racial exclusiveness helped to reinforce the state's autonomy in South Africa
as did a degree of social and cultural distance between political and economic elites. In
relatively economically diversified Rhodesia the state has also been able to maintain a balance
between the interests of different sectors of capital, notwithstanding the powerful influence
exercised by settler farmers; in certain respects the ascendency of a African nationalist
governing class in 1980 has strengthened state autonomy. Much the same argument can be
developed with respect to Namibia where former African guerillas inherited a colonial
bureaucracy with a similar social orientation to Rhodesia's. With respect to Botswana, the
social connections of a landowning rancher class and the political elite are very intimate; here
the state's measure of social insulation is a reflection of the idiosyncratic preferences of a
ruling group whose economic base was well established before decolonisation. Retaining the
services of a large group of ex-patriate technocrats helped to protect the bureaucracy from
social pressure. Several of the structural predeterminants of Botswana state autonomy were
present in early post-colonial Malawi and Swaziland, notably the existence of a landowning
class: the possibility of capital accumulation outside the state already existed. However, in
these two countries, unlike Botswana, state power was employed to create huge patrimonial
estates in which the distinction between the private and public domain became very blurred
indeed. In Lesotho an extreme degree of external fiscal dependence tightly constrains state
autonomy; for over two decades after independence, though, a government representing
junior chiefs consolidated the fortunes of this group through adroit exploitation of dbnor
agencies' susceptibilities to accord Lesotho a special rank in their priorities. Of all our case
studies, though, Zambia resembles the most stereotypical "economy of affection"13-1. In this
country, the state served as the main motor of indigenous class formation and a swiftly
expanding public sector supplied a generous field of political patronage. In Angola and
Mozambique violent decolonisations allowed insurgent elites to capture political power. In
both cases the ruling groups were ideologically and culturally distinctive and their initial
policies suggested a freedom from the communal and moral restraints which bound other
African states to prevalent social conventions. Even without the force of external military
131For definition see Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, London, Heinemann, 1980, pp. 18-19.
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aggression, though, the frail and permeable foundations of state power in these two territories
would have made the revolutions from above contemplated by their governments impossibly
ambitious. In each of the four territories in which the state's internal freedom of manoeuvre
was quite limited, Lesotho, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola, their governments developed
extreme degrees of foreign indebtedness which today detract significantly from their
sovereignty.
With the exception of the former Portuguese territories, state reach in Southern African
countries is extensive either because it reflects substantial bureaucratic systems of repression
and control developed during the colonial period in quite diversified modern economies (as
in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa) or because of the very small size of the territories
(Swaziland and Lesotho) or the relative density or concentration of population and social
networks (Malawi and Zambia). In the cases of Lesotho and Malawi state penetration was
chiefly manifest in the power of repressive agencies which were built along earlier networks
of pervasive nationalist mobilisation which themselves reflected the depth of proletarianisation
through migrant labour. State access to mineral wealth permitted the expansion of subsidies,
welfare services, and social security on a considerable scale in Zambia during the 1960s and
early seventies and, more recently in Botswana. Relatively efficient state distributive
networks in Botswana dated from an unusually effective colonial famine relief system, an
institutional response to an especially harsh climatic environment. In Zambia, Lesotho, and
Malawi shrinking resources and foreign indebtedness has led to a geographical contraction
of the state and its effective disappearance from remoter rural areas. Counter-insurgency
campaigns in Rhodesia and Namibia during the 1980s and the 1990s encouraged colonial
states to reorganise settlement and expand welfare services to an extent well beyond the
normal reach of colonial states elsewhere in Africa. Counter-insurgency in Mozambique and
Angola also strengthened state capacity and supplied some of the impetus for post colonial
social engineering efforts in former "protected villages". Civil wars and South African
"destabilisation" put paid to any efforts to expand the scope of state institutions in
Mozambique and Angola and in contemporary peacetime Mozambique the administration's
fiscal helplessness has led to a direct usurpation of its functions by foreign NGOs.
Obviously state authority is closely tied to the effectiveness of its repressive and welfare
components. To be sure, that authority can be considered legitimate simply if the majority
of a repressive state's subjects perceive no conceivable alternative to its rule; outside of
South Africa before 1976 and Rhodesia before the inception of peasant-based guerilla
warfare, no Southern African state has possessed coercive power on a sufficient scale to rule
without ideological forms of legitimation. Even in South Africa, racially limited
representative democracy and accompanying liberal institutions was a significant component
of state rule and probably affected values and expectations amongst a large section of the
disenfranchised. Liberal democracy has shaped the post colonial histories of Botswana,
Namibia and Zimbabwe and in the case of Zambia the existence of a strategically placed and
very well organised labour movement quite independent from the control of the ruling party
compelled the state to invest heavily in ideological activity and to allow measures of freedom
and choice within the constraints of one party politics. In Swaziland traditional
patrimonialism and in Lesotho and Malawi neo-traditionalist discourses help to sustain the
state's authority but in these cases ideology probably has had less to do with the long survival
of autocratic government than the relative ease of governing geographically small countries,
and, in the case of Swaziland, the kingdom's relative wealth. In Angola the state's
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ideological legitimacy was contested from its inception and it has yet to obtain territorial
hegemony: this reflects an especially fragmented expansion of colonial society in three
distinctive regions within the country. In Mozambique the post-colonial government might
have fared better had it not adopted ideologies and programmes so much at odds with the
beliefs and aspirations of most rural people.
To what extent has post-colonial Southern Africa been administered by effective and rule
regulated bureaucracies geared to developmental ethics? South Africa, Namibia, settler
Rhodesia, and modern Botswana evolved professionalised and technically competent
bureaucracies and direct political interference remains in each quite limited. In Malawi as
well the long period during which ex-patriate experts were retained helped to socially insulate
the civil service. Relatively slow rates of bureaucratic expansion have helped to maintain
bureaucratic quality. Civil services have been least effective where their functions have been
replicated by party or parastatal structures and where political leaders have prevailed in
recruitment and promotion: Zambia, Lesotho, Mozambique and Angola are all cases in point.
In South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, and more arguably, Malawi and Namibia,
the state has been rather effective in promoting local accumulation of capital both within and
outside the public sector; in Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia and Angola the state's
deployment of resources has-tended to be more wasteful, geared either towards consumption
or to warfare. In all these territories the factors which are generally held to cause political
corruption - the persistence of pre-colonial tributary obligations, the status insecurity of
emergent as opposed to established elites, institutional expansion and proliferation, and
comparatively undifferentiated social formations132 - have been less of a feature of the
political system than elsewhere in Africa and hence bureaucratic venality has generally been
less pervasive.
At the beginning of this article it was suggested that the historical roots of modern states are
deeper in this region than elsewhere in Africa; as well as this the existence in the region of
diversified and complex capitalist economies as well as the bureaucratic requirements of large
scale labour mobilisation help to explain the evolution of comparatively resilient and effective
state structures in Southern Africa. To this might be added, notwithstanding its damaging
effect on the former Portuguese territories, the impact on state formation of militarisation and
warfare, as well the integrative role played by fairly vigorous working class mobilisation,
and relatively early development of state programmes of legitimation arising from the
presence of enfranchised settler minorities. Finally, the existence of developmentally
effective states in the region seems to more or less coincide with those societies in which
early modern state formation was closely linked to the consolidation of a local agricultural
bourgeoisie. Southern African state hardness is derived from structural features of the
region's political economy and historical characteristics which distinguish it quite sharply
from the rest of post colonial Africa.
132Goran Hyden, No Short Cuts to Progress, Heinemann, London, 1983, pp. 100-102; Victor Levine, Political
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